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Abstract 
 
 
The cost of information is an often ignored factor in economic situations although the 
information acquisition behavior of the decision makers has a crucial influence on the 
outcome. In this experiment, we study an information aggregation process in which 
participants decide in a random sequence. Participants observe predecessors’ decisions 
and can acquire additional private information at a fixed price. We analyze participants’ 
information acquisition behavior and updating procedures. About one half of the 
individuals act rationally, whereas the other participants systematically overestimate the 
private signal value. This leads to excessive signal acquisitions and reduced conformity. 
JEL C92, D8 
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Sequential, non-revocable economic decisions must be made in a multitude of everyday 
situations. Before making the final decision it is often possible to gather additional costly private 
information. For example, an institutional or private investor is considering a new investment. 
Believing in efficient markets it is not always necessary to acquire additional information. 
However, existing or imagined inefficiencies may lead to spending money by acquiring 
information from someone or by searching to find new information. Obviously, this is only 
rational if the expected additional information value given the new private information is at least 
as high as the information cost. 
Searching a new dean for a business school is another example in which additional information 
can be acquired. The search committee must decide in various stages of the search process 
whether they want to hire somebody whose application is already available. Alternatively, it is 
possible to ask (and pay) consultants to find other suitable candidates. Even some potentially low 
stake decisions such as choosing a restaurant for dinner may involve a decision whether to rely 
on others’ decisions or to buy a restaurant guide. 
In general, information acquisition is only rational if the price is less or equal the expected 
benefit. Bayes’ law is used to calculate the benefit of the additional information.1 Deviations 
from Bayes’ law can lead to different acquisition behavior and may influence the aggregation 
process. For example, observable decisions by others may contain aggregation errors. As a result, 
acquisition behavior changes compared to Bayesian updating. On the one hand, private 
information will have a higher value and more information will be bought if public information is 
underweighted due to suspected errors. However, if others’ error rates are overestimated, this 
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  If the decision process is sequential and non-revocable, the information paradox as described by Sanford 
Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz (1980) will not arise. 
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“adjustment” is inappropriate and the decision looks like an overreaction. On the other hand, 
systematic aggregation errors can exist but they are not detected because of the belief that all 
decisions are fully rational. As a result, too few private information is bought. In both cases, 
errors can accumulate because they are not random. Thus, these errors do not cancel out and can 
lead to irrational herding. Therefore, it is necessary and useful to study information acquisition 
behavior. 
It is almost impossible to study information acquisition behavior and information revelation 
based on real world data because the fundamental value of the information cannot be determined 
due to various sources of uncertainty with regard to public and private information. For example, 
timing of decisions can significantly change the aggregation process and thus the information 
value. Even in laboratory markets as in Copeland and Friedman (1991/1992) as well as in Sunder 
(1992), it is difficult to find explanations why specific individuals bought information. By 
simplifying the aggregation process to a sequential decision process with random ordering, we 
can extract and analyze individual errors concerning both, the acquisition behavior and the 
updating procedures. 
In our experiment with costly private information, the acquisition behavior reveals the assumed 
relationship between private and public information. In addition, the decisions allow us to 
determine the actual updating errors. Even though our focus is not the investigation of the 
cascades phenomenon, we use the experimental framework introduced by Anderson and Holt 
(1997) because it provides a simple and sufficient aggregation process. 
Anderson and Holt (1997) conducted the first experiment to analyze the development of 
information cascades based on Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992). In their experiment, 
six participants predicted sequentially, which of the two possible states, denoted by A and B, had 
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occurred. Participants received information from two sources: publicly announced predictions of 
predecessors and private information a or b, which indicated the occurred state with probability 
3
2)bB(p)aA(p == . The ordering of the subjects was determined randomly within each round. 
In this setting with free private information, cascades should occur whenever one state is 
predicted more often than the other. Cascades formed in 87 of 122 situations in which they were 
rational. Since some subjects seemed to rely more on their private information, some rational 
cascades collapsed. 
Hung and Plott (1999) used the Anderson and Holt (1997) design to study the effect of different 
incentive schemes on conformity. They estimated the weights of public and private information 
and found that even in a simple setting in which a counting heuristic leads to the same decisions 
as using Bayes’ law, participants put too much weight on their (free) private information. Nöth 
and Weber (1999) extended the Anderson and Holt (1997) design by introducing two signal 
qualities. As before, agents received private information without incurring any cost. Only 63.2% 
of all possible rational cascades developed due to subjects’ overconfidence2 and because of 
gambler’s fallacy.3 This behavior was not rational given the (unobservable) error rates of other 
participants. These results can be used as a benchmark in our experiment if a participant buys 
private information since we use the same information structure but with optional information 
acquisition. 
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  Overconfident subjects put too much weight on their private information. Huck and Oechssler (1999) studied a 
modification of the Anderson and Holt (1997) design and found that the heuristic “follow your own signal”, 
which is an extreme form of overconfidence, explains the observed behavior better than Bayes’ law. 
3
  Gambler’s fallacy is considered to be a prediction of the state, which is less likely based on either public, 
private or public and private information. 
 4
In our experiment with information acquisition, participants bought on average too many signals 
compared to a Bayesian rational individual. We identify two homogenous groups which have 
different signal acquisition behavior. About one half of the participants buy additional private 
information only if this is rational. The other participants are responsible almost exclusively for 
the excessive signal acquisitions after observing two identical and information based predictions 
of their immediate predecessors. Risk aversion, a simple position based heuristic and the 
consideration of updating and prediction errors cannot explain the observed behavior. Instead, we 
identify conservatism as the most likely reason, i.e. the decision to buy additional private 
information is based on an inadequate adjustment of priors given the public information. The 
resulting excessive information acquisition and the common overweighting of private 
information caused the collapse of rational cascades. In our experimental setting, the observed 
behavior had a negative effect on welfare but it avoided many reverse cascades in which all 
decisions are identical and ex post not correct. 
The next section contains a description of the experimental design. In section II, the rational 
Bayesian strategy is presented. Section III presents the results as well as some explanations for 
the observed behavior. Section IV concludes. 
 
I. Experimental Design and Procedures 
 
As mentioned, the experimental design is an extension of the experimental design used in Nöth 
and Weber (1999). The main difference is that private information is not available free of charge. 
Instead participants have the choice to acquire private information at a fixed price. Participants 
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shall predict sequentially which of the ex ante equally likely two possible events, denoted by A 
and B (pA = pB = 0.5), occurred in each round. 
At the beginning of each round the state is determined randomly. Then the computer draws the 
random ordering of all six subjects for that round. Finally, a private signal for each participant is 
generated randomly in a two step procedure depending on the realized state: 
1. The signal’s strength is either weak or strong with probability pW = pS = 0.5. Note that 
the signal’s strength does not depend on the realized state. 
2. If the signal should be strong, the information is drawn from an urn containing one 
wrong and four correct signals, i.e. p(A|aS) = p(B|bS) = 0.8. A weak signal is correct 
with probability p(A|aW) = p(B|bW) = 0.6. 
Before a participant submits her prediction she observes the following information without 
incurring any costs: 
• The design including all probabilities and payment procedures is public knowledge since 
it is explained as part of the instructions (see Appendix A). 
• Predictions of predecessors can be publicly observed. In addition, it is known which 
predecessors bought additional information. However, this additional information, i.e. the 
acquired signal and its’ accompanying strength, is not revealed. Moreover, predecessors’ 
identities cannot be observed since predictions are submitted anonymously and the 
participants’ ordering is determined randomly for each round. 
Based on this public information she has to decide first whether she wants to acquire a private 
signal for 15 cu (currency units), or not. As described above, the private signal can be one out of 
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four possible signals s ∈ {aS, aW, bS, bW}. Then the public and - if applicable - the private 
information can be used to predict the state. After all six participants submitted their predictions 
the true state is revealed and a new round begins. An ex post correct prediction yields 400 cu and 
a wrong prediction is accompanied by a reward of only 100 cu. The information structure is 
common knowledge since it is outlined in the instructions (see Appendix A). 
Figure 1 illustrates the course of a round. Note that subjects face no time restrictions for their 
actions. 
Figure 1: Course of a round 
The decision sequence is illustrated in this figure. Each round begins with the determination of the state, the 
signals and the ordering of the six subjects. Except for the first acting subject each acting individual receives 
information regarding the signal acquisitions of her predecessors prior to her own signal acquisition decision. 
Then she either receives a private signal followed by her own state prediction or she has to submit her state 
prediction without additional information. There is no time limit for the actions of each participant. 
The experiment was conducted in the SFB Computer Lab of the University of Mannheim in June 
1999. Each session consisted of at least 48 and not more than 60 paid rounds and lasted about two 
hours. At the end of each experiment currency units were converted to Deutsche Mark (DM) such 
n 
y 
n 
y 
1st subject decides 
(variable time) 
2nd subject decides 
(variable time) 
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that on average subjects receive DM 16.00 per hour, which was about US$ 9.00 then. Participants 
earned on average DM 35.14 for two hours, varying between DM 23.00 and DM 44.00. The 
earned currency units Vcu were converted to Deutsche Mark (DM) using the following conversion 
formula: 
( )
200
r310V32V cuDM
⋅−
+=   (r: number of rounds) (1.1) 
The conversion formula adjusts the average payment of DM 32.00 for two hours according to the 
individual’s performance. 310 cu multiplied by the number of rounds is the amount of currency 
units needed in order to earn the average payoff of DM 32.00. For each 200 cu, subjects earned 
less or more than the average payoff, DM 1.00 was subtracted or added to the average payment, 
respectively. The calculated payments were rounded up to the next DM. 
While we computed the subjects’ final payments, they had to fill out a final questionnaire (see 
Appendix B). Participants’ answers provide additional insights about individuals‘ updating 
procedures and information acquisition behavior. 66 subjects, studying business administration at 
the University of Mannheim, Germany, participated in this experiment (= 11 sessions). All 
participants had no previous experience with this experiment.  
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II. Rational Bayesian Strategy 
 
The benchmark to analyze the observed behavior is Bayesian updating (BU). Under Bayesian 
updating an individual acts rationally if she uses Bayes’ law to aggregate all available 
information. Furthermore the rational Bayesian strategy is based on the assumption that all 
predecessors acted rationally, too. We relax this assumption later while searching for possible 
explanations for the observed non-Bayesian behavior. 
In the experimental setting presented here, a Bayesian subject would eliminate first all 
predictions, which are solely based on public information using the disclosed acquisition 
decisions of her predecessors. Predictions that are not preceded by an acquisition of private 
information do not convey any additional information and should therefore be excluded from the 
further processing. This procedure generates the reduced history (of predictions). This reduced 
history is the relevant basis to evaluate the probability of the two states based on public 
information, which then determines the signal value. A participant should buy a signal if the 
difference between the expected value of the payoff Vsignal with private information and the 
expected value of the payoff Vno-signal without private information equals or exceeds the cost of 
the private signal.4 
The expected profit from buying private information based on the reduced history is calculated as 
follows. As already mentioned the probability for state A and B based on public information can 
be calculated using the reduced history. For example, if the reduced history is h1 = (A1) then the 
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 If the expected profit from buying private information is equal to the cost, we assume that a signal is bought 
since it is rational to buy private information if at least one predecessor acted non-Bayesian with an infinitely 
small probability. 
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probability that state A occurred is p(A| A1) = 0.7, assuming that the first subject acted rationally. 
This is, because a rational subject at position 1 predicts state A, if she has a strong or weak signal 
indicating state A.5 Because the two signal strengths are equally likely, the probability that state 
A occurred after observing one private informative prediction is 0.7.6 
Without private information it is rational to predict the state X that has a probability greater or 
equal to 0.5 according to the reduced history hn. Assuming risk neutrality, this leads to an 
expected value of the payoff Vno-signal (hn) without a private signal of: 
100))h|X(p1(400)h|X(p))h(V(EV nnnsignalno ⋅−+⋅=−  (2.1) 
If the participant acquires a private signal, she receives one out of four possible signals s ∈ {aW, 
aS, bW, bS} with probability 
5
2
2
1))h|S(p1(
5
3
2
1)h|S(p)h|s(p nnn ⋅⋅−+⋅⋅=  (2.2) 
if it is a weak signal that indicates state S and 
5
1
2
1))h|S(p1(
5
4
2
1)h|S(p)h|s(p nnn ⋅⋅−+⋅⋅=  (2.3) 
if it is a strong signal that indicates state S 
Using Bayes’ law the probability that state A or B occurred after observing signal s can be 
calculated. A rational subject will then predict the state X with the higher a posteriori probability, 
                                                           
5
 If nothing else is stated, “position” always refers to the decision position based on the reduced and not the 
complete history of predictions. 
6
 The probability calculations do not differ from Nöth and Weber (1999) for reduced histories. 
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which leads to an expected value of the payoff )h(V nssignal  based on the public reduced history hn 
and the private signal s of: 
100))s,h|X(p1(400)s,h|X(p))h(V(EV nnnssignal ⋅−+⋅=  (2.4) 
The probability weighted sum of the signal dependent expected payoffs )h(V nssignal  yields the 
signal independent expected value of the payoff Vsignal (hn) with private information of: 
∑
∈
⋅=
}b,b,a,a{s
nn
s
signalnsignal
SWSW
)h|s(p))h(V(EV))h(V(EV
 (2.5) 
The information value is then defined as 
IV(hn) = EV(Vsignal(hn)) – EV(Vno-signal(hn)) (2.6) 
As a result of the above calculations only 12 out of 64 histories can occur, if all participants act 
rationally. In all other cases, at least one subject diverged from rational Bayesian behavior. For 
example, the history AABBBB with information purchased by the first and second subject can 
only occur if the third subject irrationally predicts state B. This can be either due to a non-rational 
signal acquisition followed by a (possibly rational) prediction of state B or simply due to random 
errors. 
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Figure 2: Rational histories 
State predictions in capital letters are based on private as well as on public information. The numbers in brackets 
represent the signal value after observing a specific history. If the signal value is less than 15 cu, no additional 
private information is acquired. Note that observed histories might be different due to non-rational behavior. 
Figure 2 shows that it is always rational to buy a private signal at positions 1 and 2. A subject at 
position 3 then faces two possible situations. If the two predecessors made contradicting 
predictions the signal value is 25.3 cu, i.e. a signal acquisition is rational. Otherwise the signal 
value is 3.3 cu. A Bayesian individual would therefore refuse to buy private information and 
would simply follow the preceding state predictions. All subsequent subjects face the same 
situation as the third one because the preceding prediction conveys no additional information and 
should therefore be eliminated. Again, they should refuse to acquire additional information and 
simply follow the first two informative predictions. An information cascade develops. 
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In general, a cascade occurs with costly signals when it is optimal for an individual, having 
observed the predictions and information acquisition behavior of her predecessors, not to buy a 
private signal and simply follow the preceding individuals’ prediction. Figure 3 illustrates the 
signal value with an increasing number of conforming informative predictions, which eventually 
leads to an information cascade. In this setting a cascade always develops, when the two 
preceding informative predictions are identical.7 We will focus on cases of identical predictions 
of predecessors, which lead to a cascade if at least two of them are informative. 
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0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 2 3 4 5 6
Relative Position
Si
gn
al
 
V
a
lu
e 
(cu
)
AAAAAA
ABBBBB∅
A
AB
AA
ABB
AAA ABBB
AAAA
ABBBB
AAAAA
15
 
Figure 3: The decreasing expected signal value in currency units (cu) is shown in this figure if 
all participants acquire a private signal. 
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 The only exception to this rule is the reduced history ABBAA. In this case a signal acquisition is rational even 
though the two preceding information based predictions (AA at positions 4 and 5) are identical. 
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III. Results
 
The following analysis is based on experimental data collected in 11 sessions with a total of 582 
rounds. All in all, 3492 information acquisition decisions and state predictions were submitted. 
We find that participants acquired on average too many signals compared to the rational Bayesian 
benchmark. Based on the available information, participants bought 28% (=459) more signals 
than the BU model predicts (=1639).8 More specifically, subjects acquired private information in 
551 cases with an information value of less than 15 cu and refused to buy a signal in 92 cases in 
spite of an information value of more than 15 cu. On the individual level, the deviation from 
rational behavior is measured by the subject-specific excessive signal acquisitions per round. The 
excessive acquisition is calculated as the difference of actually acquired signals minus the 
signals, which should have rationally been acquired, divided by the number of rounds in which 
this subject participated. For example, if a subject participated in 48 rounds and purchased 40 
signals although she should have rationally purchased only 23 signals, then she averaged 
354.0
48
2340
=
−
 excessive signal acquisitions per round. The arithmetic mean of the individual’s 
excessive signal acquisitions per round is 0.133, which is significantly positive with a t-statistic 
of -7.9 (α<0.001).9 
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 It is always rational to buy a signal at absolute positions 1 and 2 (=582+582 acquisitions). In addition, a total of 
475 signals should be bought at absolute positions III to VI based on the non-uniform previous informative 
predictions. 
9
 The normal distribution hypothesis could not be rejected according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z of 1.019 
(α=0.250). 
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Since the decision whether to buy a signal, or not, should depend only on predictions that are 
based on new information, we will first analyze these “reduced” histories. Moreover, the 
individual behavior within identical histories may provide additional hints to find explanations 
for the excessive acquisitions. A cluster analysis to identify different types of participants is the 
next step. Based on this classification, we will analyze learning and other possible explanations 
for the observed buying behavior. Next, the position within a round, risk aversion and error rates 
influencing preceding decisions within the round will be studied. Finally, we will focus on 
overconfidence and updating conservatism as possible explanations. Before we conclude, we will 
analyze how the observed buying behavior and the resulting predictions influenced individual 
and group earnings. 
As mentioned we start by analyzing the information acquisition behavior in specific situations. In 
the following analysis these decision scenarios are differentiated by the reduced rather than the 
complete history of predictions since we assume that subjects rationally eliminated the 
uninformative predictions prior to their own information acquisition decision. This assumption is 
supported by the fact that the signal acquisition behavior in cases where the reduced history 
equals the complete history compared to those cases where the two histories differ revealed no 
obvious influence of the uninformative predictions. For example, there was in general no 
difference whether subjects had to decide based on the complete history AB with private 
information purchased by both predecessors or based on the complete history AaB with private 
information acquired by the first and third subject. 
Of special interest for the further analysis are reduced histories with identical preceding 
predictions. In this case the information value is monotonously decreasing, dropping from 60 cu 
to 15 cu to 3.33 cu after zero, one or two informative conforming predictions, respectively. After 
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three, four and five identical predictions a signal acquisition does not increase the expected 
payoff at all. This monotonously decreasing signal value makes it possible to identify a critical 
information value which induces subjects not to purchase a signal. Figure 4 illustrates the mean 
individual signal acquisition ratios after observing identical reduced histories and the according 
signal values. The individual signal acquisition ratio for a given reduced history is the number of 
signals the subject purchased after observing a particular reduced history, divided by the total 
number of observations in this situation. For example, if a subject observed a reduced history AA 
ten times and acquired a signal on six of these occasions, then her signal acquisition ratio based 
on the reduced history AA is 60%. The following analysis assumes that these individual signal 
acquisition ratios are statistically independent.10 
Signal value and average signal acquisition ratios
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Figure 4: Mean individual signal acquisition ratios after observing identical reduced histories. 
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  Both, Anderson and Holt (1997) and Hung and Plott (1999), treated all predictions as being independent. We 
will argue later that there is no reason to believe that the individual acquisition ratios are dependent based on 
the learning pattern. 
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If no informative prediction has been submitted, participants acquired on average a signal in 
99.2% of the cases. A single informative prediction led to an average signal acquisition ratio of 
94.3%. Both numbers indicate that the subjects acted mostly rational at positions 1 and 2. In cases 
in which the reduced history consisted of 3 or 4 informative identical predictions, subjects had an 
average signal acquisition ratio of 8.1% and 5.2%, respectively, which is close to the rational 
behavior. However, decisions after two informative identical predictions at position 3 exhibit a 
large fraction of non-rational behavior. The mean signal acquisition ratio is 40.9% although it 
should be 0%. Thus, the individual signal valuation is biased towards an overestimation of the 
private information value. 
Taking a closer look at the behavior of certain individuals in the case of identical reduced 
histories reveals that the behavior is homogenous at positions 1 and 2 as well as at positions 4 and 
5 but it is heterogeneous at position 3. With 53 of 66 acquisition ratios falling in the ranges 0%-
30% and 70%-100% at position 3, it should be possible to separate participants according to their 
tendency to acquire signals based on the reduced histories AA and BB. In order to verify this 
assumption we performed a cluster analysis. The resulting classification provides an answer to 
the question whether the excessive signal acquisitions are caused by occasional deviations from 
rational behavior borne by all participants or by a systematic bias that can only be attributed to a 
fraction of the subjects. The cluster analysis classified subjects based on their signal acquisition 
ratios after observing the histories A/B, AA/BB and AAA/BBB.11 Clusters were constructed to 
maximize the distance between groups measured by the squared Euclidean distance. 
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  Signal acquisitions with no preceding informative prediction were excluded because only three subjects refused 
once to buy a signal in this situation but still acquired signals in 75% of all cases. In addition, signal acquisition 
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With the exception of two individuals, the cluster analysis divided all subjects into two major 
groups. These two individuals (G
-
) acquired a signal only if no preceding informative prediction 
had been submitted. As opposed to the behavior of the other participants, this indicates an 
underestimation of the signal value. Since only two subjects showed this valuation behavior, they 
will not be analyzed separately but added to the group of rational subjects instead. This group of 
rational subjects, labeled group G0, consists of 34 subjects, who act mostly rational, i.e. they buy 
on average a signal after 0 or 1 informative prediction and they do not acquire private 
information after 2 or more informative identical predictions. The other large group, denoted by 
G+, bought on average too many signals. In addition to the rational signal acquisitions at position 
1 and 2, the 30 members acquired a private signal in most cases after 2 and sometimes even after 
3 or 4 informative identical predictions were submitted. Figure 5 illustrates the different behavior 
of the G+ group compared to the rest of the participants. 
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Figure 5: Average signal acquisition ratios based on identical reduced histories. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
ratios based on identical reduced histories at position 5 and 6 cannot be used due to the small number of 
observations. 
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The cluster analysis revealed that a well defined group of people is mainly responsible for the 
divergence from rational behavior. The G+ group averaged a signal acquisition ratio of 75.2% 
with histories AA or BB. The rest of the subjects purchased a signal in only 12.4% of these 
situations. The null hypothesis of equal means can be rejected (two-sided non-parametric Mann-
Whitney test: Z=-6.98, α<0.001). Based on the reduced histories AAA and BBB, the group G+ 
bought on average signals in 15.6% cases compared to only 1.7% by the rest of the participants, 
which is also significantly higher (Mann-Whitney: Z=-4.17, α<0.001). 
Although the clustering was performed using acquisition ratios in the case of identical histories 
the classification of subjects concerning their tendency to err on the valuation of the private 
signal is also valid in general. The group G+ was responsible for 420 of all 551 signals that were 
acquired despite the fact that the signal value was below its cost and for only 28 of all 92 
irrational non-acquisitions. On average, each member of the G+ group acquired 0.249 signals per 
round in excess of a rational trader compared to only 0.036 excessive signal acquisitions per 
round by the rest of the participants. The difference is statistically significant with a t-statistic of 
9.82 (α<0.001).12 Based on these and the above mentioned numbers we can say that the members 
of the G+ group are subject to a general overvaluation of the private signal. 
A comparison of the first fifteen and the last fifteen rounds of each experiment revealed that the 
percentage of non-rational information acquisitions increased significantly in the G+ group. The 
average acquisition ratio of the group’s members after observing a reduced history AA (or BB) 
increased from 61% in the first fifteen rounds to 91% in the last fifteen rounds (Wilcoxon Signed 
                                                           
12
 The normal distribution hypotheses could not be rejected for the rest of the participants’ and the G+ group’s 
distribution of excessive signal acquisitions per round using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Z=0.888, α=0.409; 
Z=0.703, α=0.706; respectively). 
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Ranks Test: Z=-3.306, α=0.001). Nevertheless, the behavior of the rest of the participants 
showed no signs of learning. Their percentage of information acquisitions based on the reduced 
history AA (or BB) dropped insignificantly from 17% in the first 15 rounds to 11% in the final 15 
rounds (Wilcoxon: Z=-1.232, α=0.218). Hence the increasing ratio of non-rational signal 
purchases within the G+ group is most likely not caused by inter-personal learning but rather by 
an over time strengthening intra-personal bias. If there were influences of learning among 
participants, the difference of the average acquisition ratio of both groups (G+ and G0,-) should 
decrease. Since the opposite is true, we can assume that the individual signal acquisition ratios 
are statistically independent. 
The state predictions based on public and private information are mostly in line with the results 
from the Nöth and Weber (1999) experiment and will therefore not be analyzed in detail. State 
predictions without private information based solely on the reduced history are mostly rational. In 
only 9 out of 1394 (0.65%) cases in which a subject did not acquire private information the 
following state prediction was non-rational. The rational predictions without private information 
may be a consequence of the following modified counting heuristic rather than an indication that 
participants used Bayes’ law. This heuristic, which was derived from the final questionnaire, 
produces rational state prediction in 54 out of 64 possible histories: 
At position 1, with no private information, guess the state. In all other cases without 
private information, follow the majority. If there is no majority, follow the last informed 
predecessor. 
Note that the given heuristic is based on the assumption, that the subject has already rationally or 
irrationally refused to buy a signal. Therefore, the heuristic only tries to explain the state 
predictions given the fact that the individual did not acquire private information. Unfortunately, it 
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was impossible to verify if the observed behavior can be explained by the above heuristic or if 
subjects indeed acted rationally, since 8 of the 10 cases in which the heuristic leads to a non-
rational prediction are at position 6, where we have only a small number of observations. 
Explanations for the observed acquisition behavior 
Now, we will analyze possible explanations for the observed non-rational information purchases 
following a reduced history AA (or BB). First, we investigate whether subject’s behavior can be 
explained by a simple position based heuristic. Then, we focus on possible rational explanations 
like risk aversion and a consideration of other participants’ non-rational behavior. Finally, we 
consider systematic biases like overconfidence and conservatism. 
First, we want to investigate whether information acquisitions with reduced histories AA or BB 
are influenced by the absolute position of the participant, or not. The absolute position is defined 
as the decision position based on the complete history before elimination of uninformative 
predictions. Figure 6 illustrates the results. 
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Acquisition ratios at absolute positions based on 
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Figure 6: Influence of the absolute positions on the information acquisition decision based on the 
reduced history AA or BB. 
There is no obvious influence of the absolute position on the acquisition decisions of the 
participants. The only observable effect is a tendency to acquire more signals at positions > 3 by 
the members of the G0 and G- groups. But the differences of the ratio at position 3 and the ratios 
at the other positions are not statistically significant based on a Wilcoxon test.13 The same 
analysis for the signal acquisitions based on the reduced history AAA or BBB led to similar 
results. 
The average signal acquisition ratios based on the reduced histories AA or BB of 75.2% and 
based on AB or BA of 99.45% indicate that subjects from the G+ group followed the heuristic of 
always acquiring a signal after 0, 1 or 2 informative predictions and not buying otherwise. On the 
other hand, as mentioned above, the members of the G+ group do not only commit excessive 
signal acquisitions after observing the reduced histories AA or BB but have a general tendency to 
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overestimate the signal’s value. This is supported by the significantly higher ratio of signal 
acquisitions based on the reduced histories AAA or BBB.14 In addition, the average decision time 
regarding the signal purchase of the group G+ at position 3 indicates a difference in the decision 
process depending on the underlying reduced history. In contrast to the overall average decision 
time of 4.58 sec. the average decision time based on the reduced history AB/BA was only 3.2 sec. 
Based on two identical preceding predictions (AA/BB), however, the average decision time was 
4.6 sec. This difference is statistically significant (Wilcoxon: Z=-3.655, α<0.001).15 Since the 
use of the heuristic would imply a signal acquisition regardless of the reduced history at position 
3, the decision time should not depend on the reduced history. Therefore, the significantly higher 
decision time contradicts the assumption that the above heuristic was used.  
The calculation of the signal’s value was based on the assumption that individuals are risk-
neutral. One might argue that risk aversion could have led to the excessive signal acquisitions 
facing the reduced history AA or BB. But risk aversion cannot be an explanation for the observed 
behavior in our setting since the alternative of deciding solely based on public information 
stochastically dominates the alternative of acquiring additional information in second order (see 
Appendix C for a formal argument). This means that a risk averse trader with an increasing and 
concave utility function would always prefer not to buy a private signal regardless of the specific 
shape of his utility function. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
13
  The difference of the ratios at position 3 and 4, 3 and 5 and 3 and 6 have a Z-value of -1.010 (α=0.312), -0.336  
(α=0.737) and -0.551 (α=0.581) respectively. 
14
  For the exact ratios and significance of the difference refer to the results of the cluster analysis. 
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An error model 
The information value can also be influenced by a consideration of possible mistakes committed 
by predecessors. Since we try to explain the excessive information purchases based on the 
reduced history AA (or BB), we will only consider those errors in the following analysis, which 
lead to two conforming state predictions at positions 1 and 2. Thus, errors at position 2, which 
result in a state prediction that contradicts the prediction at position 1, are not considered, because 
they lead to a reduced history AB (or BA). 
On the one hand, possible predictions errors at position 1 raise the information value because 
predictions are less informative if there is a possibility that a person at position 1 does not follow 
her signal, thus not conveying her private information. At position 2, there are one or two 
possible mistakes to be considered, depending on the second individual’s consideration of errors 
committed by her predecessor. If the subject at position 2 assumes that the first individual acted 
rationally, then the only possible error leading to a reduced history AA or BB is a prediction 
against a strong signal, which contradicts the prediction at position 1. In case the second 
individual considered a possible mistake by her predecessor there is another possible error, which 
could have led to an identical reduced history at position 3. In that case, it is rational to follow 
even a weak private signal which contradicts the first prediction if one assumes an error rate at 
position 1 large enough to force 531 )A|A(p ≤ . This means that if the second individual follows 
the first prediction even though she assumed an error rate large enough to justify a prediction 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
15
 Two subjects were excluded due to the lack of observations based on the reduced histories AB/BA. The average 
decision time of the remaining 28 subjects was significantly higher in the case of two identical preceding 
predictions. 
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according to her own weak signal, she commits a mistake which influences the information value 
at position 3. 
In order to justify a signal acquisition after observing the reduced history AA or BB the assumed 
error rates have to be large enough so that IV(AA/BB) ≥ 15 cu. We consider errors at position 1 in 
the form of a rate ε of state predictions against a strong signal. Thus, an error rate ε = 0 implies 
that the subject at position 1 acted fully rational if she received a strong signal. Assuming that 
errors after observing a weak signal are at least as likely as those based on a strong signal, an 
error rate of c1⋅ε against a weak signal at position 1 is assumed. c1 > 1 is a constant which was 
derived from the data generated in the experiments of Nöth and Weber (1999).16 
At position 2 we assume that a subject, who receives a strong or weak signal conforming to the 
prediction of her predecessor, will always act rationally and follow the signal leading to a 
reduced history AA (or BB). The same is assumed if she receives a weak signal, which 
contradicts the first prediction. Both assumptions are necessary because non-rational behavior in 
these three cases would always lead to a reduced history AB or BA. If the second individual 
receives a strong signal, which contradicts the first informative prediction, then we assume that 
she rejects her signal in favor of the public information with rate θ, leading to a reduced history 
AA (or BB). For simplicity, it is assumed that the subject at position 2 does not consider possible 
                                                           
16
  The constant c1 was derived from the Nöth and Weber (1999) experiments since in our experiment the error rate 
was ε = 0. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that with a larger number of observations the error rate 
based on a strong signal at position 1 is positive. 
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errors of her predecessor. According to the calculations outlined in section II, the above 
assumptions lead to a signal value after observing a reduced history AA (or BB) of:17 
IV (AA) = 
θεεθ
θεεθ
⋅⋅+⋅−⋅+
⋅⋅+⋅+⋅+
⋅
2319231919008100
1314125509410090030
 (3.1) 
The following figure illustrates the signal value depending on the assumed error rates ε and θ:18 
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Figure 7: Influence of changes in the error rates on the signal value IV(AA/BB)
 
From figure 7 we can see that if the subject at position 3 assumes that the individual at position 1 
acts rationally (ε = 0) no possible error rate θ at position 2 can lead to an information value over 
                                                           
17
 c1 = 4.73 is derived from the experiments by Nöth and Weber (1999). A more detailed calculation of the signal 
value is provided in Appendix D. 
18
 ε ≤ 0.2114 is assumed since ε = 0.2114 leads to an error rate after observing a weak signal at position 1 of 
c1⋅ε = 1. 
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15 cu. If irrationalities at position 2 are ruled out (θ = 0), we have to assume a rather high error 
rate of ε = 0.1181, which is almost four times as high as in the Nöth and Weber (1999) 
experiments, to justify a signal acquisition based on a reduced history AA or BB. The actual error 
rates of ε = 0 and θ = 0.0115 lead to a signal value of only 3.5 cu. If one takes into account the 
actual error rate of 0.0759 based on weak signal at position 1 instead of calculating the 
information value with an error rate of 0073.4c1 =⋅=⋅ ε  the information value increases to 4.44 
cu, which is still less than a third of the signal’s cost. The error rates of ε = 0.03 and θ = 0.023 
observed in Nöth and Weber (1999) cannot explain the excessive signal acquisitions either, 
because they imply a signal value of 6.57 cu. The above mentioned numbers indicate that one has 
to assume rather high error rates to justify the excessive signal purchases based on the reduced 
histories AA or BB, making it quite unlikely that this is the reason for the observed behavior. 
A model of non-rational information weighting 
After we have ruled out a simple heuristic, risk aversion, and errors from predecessors as possible 
explanations for the excessive signal acquisitions, we will now turn to systematic biases like 
overconfidence and conservatism. These biases influence the weights that subjects put on the 
available information. At each position subjects possess public information, which is represented 
by the predictions of the predecessors. In addition, subjects have a private signal if they chose to 
purchase one after having observed the public information. If the updating procedures are biased, 
these two types of information can either be under- or overweighted. Since we have observed 
excessive signal acquisitions, we focus on those biases that lead to higher information values than 
rational Bayesian updating. The signal value is biased upward only if subjects either underweight 
the public information (c < 1) or overweight the private information (d > 1) or both. 
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Underweighting of the public information can be due to conservatism whereas overweighting of 
the private information can be caused by overconfidence. Following Edwards (1968), we use the 
following formula for the odds in favor of state A over state B after observing the reduced history 
AA (or BB) to express weighting biases in the updating process: 
 )B(p
)A(p
)B|s(p
)A|s(p
)B|AA(p
)A|AA(p
)s,AA|B(p
)s,AA|A(p dc
21
21
21
21
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
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


=
 with  s ∈ {aW, aS, bW, bS} (3.2) 
Setting c = 1 and d = 1 leads to the rational Bayesian odds. Biases, which induce 1c ≤  and 1d ≥  
with dc ≠  lead to subjective signal values greater than the rational Bayesian signal value. 
First, we analyze whether overconfidence (d > 1), or more generally overweighting of the private 
signal, influenced the participant’s behavior. If overconfidence is the only reason for the 
excessive signal acquisitions, subjects who were mainly responsible for the non-rational signal 
acquisitions should also be more overconfident than others with regard to their state predictions. 
However, the two groups show no difference in their signal weighting behavior, i.e. the average 
ratio of rational state predictions by group G+ does not differ from that of the remaining 
participants conditional on a signal acquisition. For example, in cases an individual observed the 
reduced history A (or B) and received a bW (or aW) signal, the G+ group’s average ratio of rational 
state predictions of 41% was only slightly smaller than that of the remaining subjects who 
averaged 44% rational state predictions (Mann-Whitney: Z=-0.046, α=0.963). When subjects 
observed a reduced history AB (or BA) followed by an aW (or bW) signal, the group G+ ignored 
on average their own signal more often than the rest of the participants with an average ratio of 
20% compared to 8% by the remaining subjects (Mann-Whitney: Z=-0.82, α=0.412). Thus, 
overweighting of the private information is not the decisive influence which ultimately resulted in 
the excessive signal acquisitions even though overweighting of the private information might 
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have influenced the subjective signal value of all participants. In order to focus on the 
underweighting of the public information (c < 1), as this remains as the decisive reason for the 
excessive signal acquisitions, we set d = 1. This means that the homogenous weighting behavior 
concerning the private information of both groups is taken as the baseline to enable an isolated 
evaluation of the weighting behavior concerning the public information. Note that this does not 
rule out overconfidence in general since both groups can still be overconfident to the same extent. 
Underweighting can be caused by conservatism. According to Edwards (1968) conservatism is an 
underweighting of the available information which leads to posterior odds that are closer to prior 
odds than those obtained through rational Bayesian updating. Since we assumed that d = 1, the 
general odds formula simplifies to: 
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Some algebra together with 
2
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The probability of state A based solely on public information is determined with this formula 
simply by setting 1)B|s(p
)A|s(p
= . The following figure illustrates the relationship between c and the 
information value IV(AA/BB), which is calculated according to section II using the above 
modifications to account for conservative behavior. 
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Figure 8: Relationship between the accuracy ratio c and the signal value IV(AA/BB)
 
The solid line in figure 8 represents the case in which all participants up to position 3 are 
conservative in the described manner. The dotted line shows the case in which only the subject at 
position 3 acts conservatively and both predecessors act rationally. At certain points, the 
conservative weighting of the public information leads to a shift in the rational behavior. This 
results in discontinuities or points of non-differentiability in the signal value function. In 
particular, if the underweighting of the public information is strong enough, a decision maker will 
follow her own signal even if it is only a weak signal, which contradicts the public opinion.19 In 
                                                           
19
  In all other cases the decision maker will follow her own signal regardless of the degree of underweighting of 
the public information. 
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the case in which all participants act conservatively and 48.0c ≤  then the second subject’s 
conservative assessment of the preceding state prediction’s informativeness induces her to follow 
her own signal even if it is only a weak signal that contradicts the first prediction. As a 
consequence, the information value decreases instantly because the informativeness of the second 
prediction increases. If c decreases further, the third individual’s conservative weighting of the 
public information (AA or BB) also induces her to follow her own signal independently of the 
strength of the signal, which in turn leads to a point of non-differentiability in the signal value 
function (c = 0.24 and c = 0.32, respectively). 
Notice that the subjective information value exceeds 15 cu, which justifies a signal acquisition, if 
68.0c ≤  in both cases. The shifts in rational behavior have no influence on this critical value 
since they never cause the information value to drop below 15 cu. Even though the two different 
ways to take into account conservative weighting of public information lead to different signal 
value functions, this has no influence on the decision at position 3 whether to acquire additional 
information or not.20 
                                                           
20
  A logit regression according to Hung and Plott (1999) in order to quantify the weights that subjects put on the 
public and private information if both predecessors predicted the same state does not seem useful in our design 
because in order to estimate the parameters c and d, we need observations where participants predicted based on 
both public and private information. But since the subjects from the G+ group rationally refused to acquire a 
signal after observing a reduced history AA or BB, there are only very few observations for this group so that a 
regression is not possible due to the lack of data. 
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Welfare 
The effect of the observed non-rational behavior on the aggregation process and on welfare is our 
next topic. We compare the histories of each round, which would have occurred if all participants 
had acted rationally, to the observed histories. Deviations from rational behavior will be analyzed 
further in order to identify the reason of non-rational behavior. 
 
Actual 
Rational 
Correct 
cascades 
Reverse 
cascades 
Non-cascades Sum 
Correct 
cascades 
283 2 109 394 
Reverse 
cascades 
3 40 53 96 
Non-cascades 4 4 84 92 
Sum 290 46 246 582 
Table 1: Comparison of rational and actual histories. 
From table 1 we can see that 167 (3+2+53+109) of 490 rational cascades collapsed.21 In 5 (3+2) 
of these 167 cases even the opposite cascade developed. Taking a closer look at those cases in 
which the rational cascade collapsed reveals that in 60 of these 167 cases (35.93%) a non-rational 
information acquisition preceded a deviation from rational behavior, whereof 57 signal purchases 
are based on a reduced history AA or BB. In 56 cases the private signal was revealed through the 
following state prediction. Other reasons for a deviation from rational behavior include 
overweighting of the private signal22 (41.92%) and random errors (17.96%). Overweighting is 
                                                           
21
  Correct cascades are cascades in which all individuals predict the state that actually occurred. Reverse cascades 
are cascades in which all participants predict the state that did not occur. 
22
  Note that this is not inconsistent with the above stated assumption that d = 1, since our model only tries to 
explain the behavior of the group G+ relative to that of the remaining subjects. Therefore subjects can still be 
overconfident on an absolute level. 
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referred to as a rational information acquisition with a subsequent non-Bayesian prediction that 
reveals the private signal, possibly due to overconfidence. Following these numbers and taking 
into account that state predictions without private information are mostly rational, we can say that 
the excessive signal acquisitions at position 3 based on identical reduced histories are a major 
reason for the collapse of rational cascades. 
To expose the effect of the observed behavior on general welfare, we first have to mention that in 
126 of 167 cases the non-rational behavior led to a disclosure of the private information and 
therefore increased the public information level. Nevertheless, the aggregated payoffs dropped 
from 1,146,270 cu if all participants were Bayesian to 1,137,030 cu actually paid.23 If we divide 
the effect of deviations from rational cascades between correct and reverse rational cascades, 
deviations from correct rational cascades induce on average 1.81 following incorrect state 
predictions and 580.7 cu less aggregate payoff, whereas deviations from reverse rational cascades 
lead on average to 3.73 subsequent correct state predictions and 1082.4 cu more aggregate 
payoff. Both differences are highly significant according to a Mann-Whitney test with a Z-
statistic of -6.7 (α<0.001) and -4.57 (α<0.001), respectively. Thus, the positive effect from 
avoiding a rational reverse cascade clearly outnumbers the negative effect from avoiding a 
rational correct cascade. But this positive relation did not lead to an increase in general welfare 
because rational cascades collapsed more often than reverse cascades due to our information 
structure, which induces a higher probability for the formation of a rational cascade. This means 
that the negative effect occurs more often offsetting the more intense positive effect in terms of 
aggregated payoffs. 
                                                           
23
 Note that 349,200 cu (582 rounds * 6 participants * 100 cu) were safe payments in both cases since even a 
wrong prediction yielded a payoff of 100 cu. 
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Taking into account that the non-rational behavior led to a disclosure of the private information in 
most cases and following the model of Bernardo and Welch (1999) an optimal fraction of non-
rationally acting individuals combined with an increased number of participants may produce 
different results. First of all, an increased number of participants leads to an increased number of 
decision makers who can benefit from non-rational behavior, which reveals private information. 
Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that deviations from rational correct cascades are only 
temporary. Because of the information structure, non-rational behavior leads to additional signal 
acquisitions, which in turn raise the public information level and lead to a convergence to the 
correct state. Under these assumption the positive effect from collapsed reverse cascades would 
increase with an increasing number of participants leaving the negative effect from collapsed 
correct cascades unchanged. Assuring an optimal fraction of non-rational participants this could 
lead to an increase in aggregate payoffs. 
Individuals earned on average 5 cu per round less than if they would have acted rational based on 
their given information. Individuals from the G+ group, who tend to overestimate the signal 
value, performed worst with an average of 6.7 cu per round less than a Bayesian trader. The rest 
earned 3.6 cu per round less than the BU-model predicts. This difference is not statistically 
significant (Mann-Whitney: Z=-0.335, α=0.738). 
Summing up we can say, that the observed behavior led to a decrease in general welfare because 
the negative effect thereof occurred more often although having less extend than the positive 
effect. An alternation in the setting may have produced different results. 
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IV. Conclusions 
We investigated the information acquisition behavior in a simple aggregation process in this 
experiment. Almost half of the subjects tend to overestimate the signals‘ value leading to 
excessive signal acquisitions. These non-rational information purchases cannot be explained by 
neither risk aversion nor the use of a simple position based heuristic. A consideration of possible 
errors committed by predecessors also seems to be no reasonable explanation for the observed 
anomalies. 
We developed a model, which explains the excessive signal acquisitions through conservative 
assessment of the weights that subjects put on preceding state prediction. Although 
overweighting of private information raises the subjective signal value too, the observed updating 
procedures do not support that this was the decisive reason for the non-rational signal 
acquisitions. Influences, which were not integrated in our model and which cannot be verified 
based on the given data, include regret aversion and locus of control. 
Even though the observed behavior increased the public information level, it led to a decrease in 
aggregate payoffs. Nevertheless there might be other environments in which the observed 
behavior is favorable from a welfare perspective. The purpose of future research should be a 
better identification of the reasons which lead to excessive private information gathering as well 
as an investigation of the consequences of the observed behavior in market situations. Of high 
interest is the question whether excessive private information acquisition can prevent 
misaggregation of information in financial markets weakening the effects of herding. 
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Appendix A 
 
Sequential Information Processing Experiment 
Instructions 
 
Thank you for your participation in this experiment of economic decision making. The money for 
your payment has been provided by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. This session will 
probably last about two hours. Please follow the instructions very carefully, in order to earn as 
much money as possible. You can always ask questions until the end of the test rounds. 
Information structure and course of a round 
In this experiment you shall predict the occurred state in each round based on your given 
information. 
The course of the experiment is as follows. Two states, named A and B, can occur. Which one of 
the two states occurs is determined through a coin toss at the beginning of each round, i.e. both 
states are equally likely. 
Your task is to predict the occurred state, which is not publicly observable. The ordering of the 
six participants is determined randomly in each round. 
One source of information for your prediction are the publicly announced predictions of your 
predecessors. Along with the preceding state predictions the computer also displays if the 
predecessor bought a private signal or not, when it is your turn to predict the occurred state. 
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In addition to that public information you have the opportunity to acquire a private signal for 15 
cu, which only you can see. This private signal gives you an indication which state could have 
occurred. The private signal will be determined depending on the true state as follows: 
• First, a fair coin toss (
2
1p = ) determines if the signal is either strong or weak. 
• The signal is now being determined, dependant on its strength, by a draw from an urn with 10 
signals: 
• The “strong” urn contains 8 signals indicating the occurred state and 2 signals indicating the 
opposite state. That means, the strong signal indicates the occurred state with a probability of 
p = 0.8 and the opposite state with a probability of p = 0.2. 
• The “weak” urn contains 6 signals indicating the occurred state and 4 signals indicating the 
opposite state. That means, the weak signal indicates the occurred state with a probability of 
p = 0.6 and the opposite state with a probability of p = 0.4. 
The following figure illustrates the determination of the signal. 
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If you have decided to acquire a signal the computer display the signal, as well as the 
accompanying strength of the signal. Afterwards you will be asked to submit your state 
prediction. If you refuse to buy a signal you have to submit your prediction immediately. Take 
into account that you have to spend 15 cu to buy a signal. 
The rest of the participants can observe the predictions of their predecessors, which are made 
public after submission in the lower part of the program window. However, they cannot infer 
neither the underlying signal nor the accompanying signal’s strength. The identification of the 
participant is not possible either. Your position within a round is displayed as a red number. 
coin toss to determine 
the signals’ strength
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Attention: An additional information cannot be inferred from the reaction time of the acting 
participant since the computer enforces a random delay of at least 2 and not more 
than 5 seconds before asking for the state prediction even if the participant decides 
not to buy a signal. 
As soon as all six participants have made their decisions, the occurred state will be announced 
and a further round (with new information) begins. 
Test rounds 
Before you can start earning money with your predictions, you will get to know the course of the 
experiment in three unpaid test rounds. During these test rounds you can always ask question 
about the information structure and the course of the experiment. 
Payment 
You will participate in at least 40 rounds, in which you will be paid according to the correctness 
of your predictions. For each correct predictions you will receive 400 cu and for each false 
prediction only 100 cu. A private signal costs 15 cu. At the end of the experiment your total 
payoff will be converted in Deutsche Mark (DM) according to the expected hourly earnings of 16 
DM. 
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Appendix B 
 
Final questionnaire 
1. Which decision rule (or heuristic) have you used to decide whether to buy a private signal or 
not? 
2. Which decision rule (or heuristic) have you used to make your state prediction? Did it make 
any difference to you, if you acted at the beginning, in the middle or at the end of a round? 
3. Has your behavior changed during the experiment? If so, why? 
4. In which way did you use the information concerning the signal acquisitions of your 
predecessors in your own decisions? 
 
Appendix C 
 
 
If the subject with the utility function u(x) refuses to acquire a private signal, the expected utility 
based on the reduced history AA is calculated as follows: 
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The acquisition of a private signal yields an expected utility of: 
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A signal acquisition is rational if: 
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The following figure illustrates the relation between the two lotteries: 
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Because of the 2nd order stochastic dominance there exists no increasing and concave utility 
function, which satisfies the above condition. 
 
Appendix D 
Calculation of the information value based on the reduced histories AA 
or BB in consideration of possible errors of predecessors 
Possible errors at position 1 are taken into account in the form of a rate ε of predictions against a 
strong signal at position 1 and a rate c1⋅ε of predictions against a weak signal. Due to the larger 
number of observations the constant c1 was derived from Nöth and Weber (1999). This led to 
c1 = 4.73 inducing a probability that the first subject predicts state A under the condition that 
state A occurred of: 
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 ε⋅−= 773.0
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If one assumes that subjects at position 2 predict against a strong signal, which contradicts the 
prediction at position 1, with rate θ, the probability of a prediction of state A at position 2 under 
the condition that state A occurred and the first subject predicted A is: 
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This leads to a probability of state A based solely on the reduced history AA of: 
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The probability of state A after observing the private signal s is calculated as follows: 
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According to the calculations of the signal value in section II this ultimately leads to a signal 
value based on the reduced history AA of: 
 
θεεθ
θεεθ
⋅⋅+⋅−⋅+
⋅⋅+⋅+⋅+
⋅=
2319231919008100
1314125509410090030)AA(IV  
SONDERFORSCHUNGSBereich 504 WORKING PAPER SERIES
Nr. Author Title 1
00-49 Thomas Langer
Martin Weber
The Impact of Feedback Frequency on Risk Taking:
How general is the Phenomenon?
00-48 Niklas Siebenmorgen
Martin Weber
The Influence of Different Investment Horizons on
Risk Behavior
00-47 Roman Inderst
Christian Laux
Incentives in Internal Capital Markets
00-46 Niklas Siebenmorgen
Martin Weber
A Behavioral Approach to the Asset Allocation
Puzzle
00-45 Thomas Langer
Rakesh Sarin
Martin Weber
The Retrospective Evaluation of Payment
Sequences: Duration Neglect and
Peak-and-End-Effects
00-44 Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan Soziale Sicherung: Herausforderungen an der
Jahrhundertwende
00-43 Rolf Elgeti
Raimond Maurer
Zur Quantifizierung der Risikopra¨mien deutscher
Versicherungsaktien im Kontext eines
Multifaktorenmodells
00-42 Martin Hellwig Nonlinear Incentive Contracting in Walrasian
Markets: A Cournot Approach
00-41 Tone Dieckmann A Dynamic Model of a Local Public Goods
Economy with Crowding
00-40 Claudia Keser
Bodo Vogt
Why do experimental subjects choose an
equilibrium which is neither risk nor payoff
dominant
00-39 Christian Dustmann
Oliver Kirchkamp
The Optimal Migration Duration and Activity
Choice after Re-migration
00-38 Niklas Siebenmorgen
Elke U. Weber
Martin Weber
Communicating Asset Risk: How the format of
historic volatility information affects risk
perception and investment decisions
00-37 Siegfried K. Berninghaus The impact of monopolistic wage setting on
innovation and market structure
SONDERFORSCHUNGSBereich 504 WORKING PAPER SERIES
Nr. Author Title 2
00-36 Siegfried K. Berninghaus
Karl-Martin Ehrhart
Coordination and information: Recent experimental
evidence
00-35 Carlo Kraemer
Markus No¨th
Martin Weber
Information Aggregation with Costly Information
and Random Ordering: Experimental Evidence
00-34 Markus No¨th
Martin Weber
Information Aggregation with Random Ordering:
Cascades and Overconfidence
00-33 Tone Dieckmann
Ulrich Schwalbe
Dynamic Coalition Formation and the Core
00-32 Martin Hellwig Corporate Governance and the Financing of
Investment for Structural Change
00-31 Peter Albrecht
Thorsten Go¨bel
Rentenversicherung versus Fondsentnahmepla¨ne,
oder: Wie groß ist die Gefahr, den Verzehr des
eigenen Vermo¨gens zu u¨berleben?
00-30 Roman Inderst
Holger M. Mu¨ller
Karl Wa¨rneryd
Influence Costs and Hierarchy
00-29 Dezso¨ Szalay Optimal Delegation
00-28 Dezso¨ Szalay Financial Contracting, R&D and Growth
00-27 Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan Rentabilita¨tsvergleiche im Umlage- und
Kapitaldeckungsverfahren: Konzepte, empirische
Ergebnisse, sozialpolitische Konsequenzen
00-26 Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan
Annette Reil-Held
How much is transfer and how much insurance in a
pay-as-you-go system? The German Case.
00-25 Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan Rentenreform und die Bereitschaft zur
Eigenvorsorge: Umfrageergebnisse in Deutschland
00-24 Christian Ewerhart Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most
two steps
00-23 Christian Ewerhart An Alternative Proof of Marshalls´ Rule
SONDERFORSCHUNGSBereich 504 WORKING PAPER SERIES
Nr. Author Title 3
00-22 Christian Ewerhart Market Risks, Internal Models, and Optimal
Regulation: Does Backtesting Induce Banks to
Report Their True Risks?
00-21 Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan A Blue Print for Germany’s Pension Reform
00-20 Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan Data and Research on Retirement in Germany
00-19 Henning Plessner
Tilmann Betsch
Sequential effects in important sport-decisions: The
case of penalties in soccer
00-18 Susanne Haberstroh
Ulrich Ku¨hnen
Daphna Oyserman
Norbert Schwarz
Is the interdependent self a better communicator
than the independent self? Self-construal and the
observation of conversational norms
00-17 Tilmann Betsch
Susanne Haberstroh
Connie Ho¨hle
Explaining and Predicting Routinized Decision
Making: A Review of Theories
00-16 Susanne Haberstroh
Tilmann Betsch
Henk Aarts
When guessing is better than thinking: Multiple
bases for frequency judgments
00-15 Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan
Angelika Eymann
Household Portfolios in Germany
00-14 Annette Reil-Held Einkommen und Sterblichkeit in Deutschland:
Leben Reiche la¨nger?
00-13 Nikolaus Beck
Martin Schulz
Comparing Rule Histories in the U.S. and in
Germany: Searching for General Principles of
Organizational Rules
00-12 Volker Stocke´ Framing ist nicht gleich Framing. Eine Typologie
unterschiedlicher Framing-Effekte und Theorien zu
deren Erkla¨rung
00-11 Oliver Kirchkamp
Rosemarie Nagel
Local and Group Interaction in Prisoners’ Dilemma
Experiments — Imitate locally, think globally
00-10 Oliver Kirchkamp
Benny Moldovanu
An experimental analysis of auctions with
interdependent valuations
SONDERFORSCHUNGSBereich 504 WORKING PAPER SERIES
Nr. Author Title 4
00-09 Oliver Kirchkamp WWW Experiments for Economists, a Technical
Introduction
00-08 Alfred Kieser
Ulrich Koch
Organizational Learning through Rule Adaptation:
From the Behavioral Theory to Transactive
Organizational Learning
00-07 Raimond Maurer
Steffen Sebastian
Inflation Risk Analysis of European Real Estate
Securities
00-06 Martin Hellwig Costly State Verification: The Choice Between Ex
Ante and Ex Post Verification Mechanisms
00-05 Peter Albrecht
Raimond Maurer
100% Aktien zur Altersvorsorge - ¨Uber die
Langfristrisiken einer Aktienanlage
00-04 Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan Aging and the Pension Crisis: Flexibilization
through Capital Markets
00-03 Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan Data and Research on Saving in Germany
00-02 Raimond Maurer
Alexander Mertz
Internationale Diversifikation von Aktien- und
Anleiheportfolios aus der Perspektive deutscher
Investoren
00-01 Office SFB504 Jahresbericht 1999
99-89 Holger M. Mu¨ller
Roman Inderst
Project Bundling, Liquidity Spillovers, and Capital
Market Discipline
99-88 Raimond Maurer
Gyo¨ngyi Buga`r
Efficient Risk Reducing Strategies by International
Diversification: Evidence from a Central European
Emerging Market
99-87 Berit Ernst
Alfred Kieser
In Search of Explanations for the Consulting
Explosion. A Critical Perspective on Managers’
Decisions to Contract a Consultancy
99-86 Martin Hellwig
Andreas Irmen
Wage Growth, Productivity Growth, and the
Evolution of Employment
